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SUBSEQUENT HISTORY
Each year a number of Tenth Circuit decisions which the
Journal has selected for comment and analysis will subsequently
be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Throughout this issue
we have attempted to note cases for which petitions for certiorari
have been filed and what disposition, if any, has been made of
those petitions prior to our publication deadline. When the Su-
preme Court grants review to a decision of the Tenth Circuit and
an opinion is rendered, the Journal will utilize this section of the
Tenth Circuit Survey to comment on the Supreme Court's deci-
sion. As a feature of this initial issue, we include comments on
two Supreme Court decisions from the last term treating cases
which originated in the Tenth Circuit.
I. CIVIL RIGHTS-TITLE VII-ARBITRATION IS NO BAR
TO EMPLOYEE'S RIGHT TO TRIAL DE NOVO IN FEDERAL
COURT IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION SUIT
BASED ON SAME CLAIM
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974)
By THOMAS L. ROBERTS*
INTRODUCTION
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,' a unanimous opinion
authored by Mr. Justice Powell, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed
a decision by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,2 and, in so
doing, set forth an important exegesis of the nature and character
of employment discrimination suits brought by private employ-
ees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1
Alexander comprehensively analyzes the relationship be-
tween federal courts and grievance-arbitration apparatuses typi-
cally included in collective-bargaining agreements. In general
terms the Court explored and contrasted formal and informal
* Member of Colorado Bar; Law Clerk to Judge Sherman G. Finesilver, United States
District Court for the District of Colorado; B.A., 1966, University of Iowa; J.D., 1974,
University of Denver.
1 415 U.S. 36 (1974). See generally Nash, Board Referral to Arbitration and Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver: Some Preliminary Observations, 25 LABOR L.J. 259 (1974); Oppen-
heim, Gateway & Alexander, Whither Arbitration? 48 TuL. L. REv. 973 (1974); Comment,
Civil Rights-Title VII-Prior Resort to Arbitration Under a Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment Does Not Preclude an Employee from Bringing Suit in Federal Court Under Title
VI-Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), 43 U. CiN. L. REv. 661 (1974).
2 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972), aff'g per curiam 346 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo. 1971).
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1972), as amended.
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means of resolving labor disputes. Specifically, it held that prior
submission of an employee's claim of discrimination in employ-
ment to final arbitration pursuant to a nondiscrimination clause
in a collective-bargaining agreement does not foreclose prosecu-
tion of the same claim by a trial de novo in federal court under
Title VII.
In reaching this conclusion the Court stressed the important
function which Congress intended such suits to fulfill and clearly
manifested an attitude of judicial hospitality toward them.
Alexander thus represents a significant victory for potential Title
VII claimants not only in the Court's refusal to bar suit by an
employee who has attempted to preserve his rights through resort
to arbitration, but also in its strong language evincing a liberal
stance with respect to equal employment opportunity litigation.
Following a brief outline of the nature of a Title VII action
and a sketch of the factural background appearing in Alexander,
this comment will discuss the case as it was treated in the three
tiers of the federal court system.
I. TITLE VII ACTIONS
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19645 prohibits those
employers within its purview from discriminating against any
employee on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.' Enforcement of the Act is left largely to private persons
who have the right to bring suit in federal court against their
employer if they believe themselves the victim of an unlawful
discriminatory practice.'
Prior to institution of an action in federal court, however, the
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 46 n.6, 59-60 (1974).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-15 (1964). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
significantly changed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103
(1972). For the sake of convenience, all citations to the Act in this article are to the 1972
Act, unless otherwise indicated, despite the fact that the present case was instituted prior
to this amendment. The changes wrought by the 1972 Act, as to the character of the right
to sue conferred upon employees of private employers, are not relevant.
1 42 U.S.C. 99 2000e-2(a)(1) to (2) (Supp. II, 1972). Coverage of the Act extends to,
among others, private employers engaged in an industry affecting commerce who employ
15 or more employees for 20 or more weeks per year. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. 11, 1972).
1 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(i) (Supp. II, 1972). The 1972 Act increased the power of
the EEOC to secure enforcement of Title VII by allowing it to file suits in its own name.
Id. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1964). Despite this change, however, the fundamental
enforcement thrust still resides with individual complainants. See, e.g., Jenkins v. United
Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968). See generally, Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered:
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824 (1972).
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aggrieved employee must first submit his claim to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) for investiga-
tion.8 The claim must be submitted within 180 days from the
occurrence of the alleged discriminatory act.9
If the EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe that the res-
pondent company did, in fact, discriminate against the claimant
in an unlawful manner, it "shall endeavor to eliminate any such
alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of
conference, conciliation, and persuasion."' 0 If these informal ef-
forts fail to achieve a conciliation agreement which satisfies the
requirements of Title VII, the matter may thereafter proceed to
formal litigation. If the company refuses to accede to conciliation,
the EEOC itself may institute suit in its own name or merely
notify the claimant of his right to sue." If the employee-claimant
presents the obstacle to conciliation, the EEOC will terminate its
involvement and issue to the employee a "right to sue letter"
informing him of his right to file a civil action pursuant to Title
VII within 30 days from receipt of the letter.'2 If, as a result of its
investigation of an employee's charge, the EEOC is satisfied that
no reasonable cause has been demonstrated to believe the claim,
the employee still receives a "right to sue letter" and may file suit
within the specified period.
Thus a Title VII plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of his
rights in federal court regardless of what informal measures have
been taken by the EEOC prior to the filing of a complaint in
court. An EEOC finding of cause is not a jurisdictional prerequis-
ite. There are only two jurisdictional prerequisites to a Title VII
suit brought by an employee of a private company.' 3 First, the
employee must have filed his claim of discrimination with the
EEOC in timely fashion; and, second, he must have received the
statutory notice of his right to sue from the EEOC and have filed
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. 11, 1972).
Id. § 2000e-5(e).
10 Id. § 2000e-5(b).
Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). This requirement has been codified in 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.25,
1601.25b (1974).
11 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1970). The 1972 Act extended this period to 90 days. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. 11, 1972).
"2 The qualification, "employee of a private company," is necessary because the
jurisdictional prerequisites for suits brought by employees of governmental organization
are different. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. 11, 1972) which controls suits brought
against agencies of the federal government. The EEOC has no role in these actions; rather,
the initial charge must be filed with the Civil Service Commission.
1975
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the federal complaint within the 30-day period. 4
Having reached federal court in proper fashion, a Title VII
private-employee plaintiff is entitled to a full-dress trial de
novo. 15 Remedies available under the Act are restricted to those
equitable in nature; injunctive, restitutional, and/or "any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate."'" Consequently,
most courts have characterized Title VII suits as being equitable
in nature, concluding that monetary damages, compensatory or
punitive, are unavailable 7 and that there is no right to trial by
jury. 8 The matter is therefore tried to the court, sitting in equity,
with a full panoply of equitable remedies at its disposal.
In sum, an employee who feels himself the object of discrimi-
nation at the hands of his private employer need only file a charge
with the EEOC within 180 days from the happening of the event
complained of, and then, regardless of subsequent events (short
of a conciliation agreement to which he consents), he may bring
suit in federal court on the claim within 30 days from receipt of
the statutory notice of right to sue. He is then entitled to a trial
de novo on his complaint in equity.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Harrell Alexander, Sr., a black male, accepted a job with the
Gardner-Denver Company at its Denver, Colorado, plant in May
of 1966 as a maintenance worker.8 After having been with the
company for 2 years, he secured a position as a drill press operator
trainee in June 1968. He held this assignment until his discharge
from the company on September 29, 1969. As reason for Alexan-
der's release, the company informed him that his performance
" McDonnel Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973).
" Id. at 799.
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1972).
" See, e.g., Loo v. Gerarge, 374 F. Supp. 1338 (D. Hawaii 1974); Howard v. Lockheed-
Georgia Co., 7 E.P.D. 9335 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 7 E.P.D.
9146 (N.D. Cal. 1973). Monetary relief is available under Title VII, but it is restricted
to back pay liability, a remedy which has been construed as restitutional and thus equita-
ble in nature. See generally, Comment, Back Pay for Employment Discrimination Under
Title VI-Role of the Judiciary in Exercising its Discretion, 23 CAT. U.L. REv. 525
(1974); Comment, Equal Employment Opportunity: The Back Pay Remedy Under Title
VII, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 379. Back pay liability is subject to strict time limitation, and the
maximum period for its award is two years prior to filing of the discrimination charge with
the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. H, 1972).
1 See Loo v. Gerarge, 374 F. Supp. 1338 (D. Hawaii 1974); EEOC v. Laacke & Joys
Co., 7 E.P.D. 9258 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Sape & Hart, supra note 7, at 878.
1, This factual summary is, unless otherwise noted, taken from Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 38-43 (1974).
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was substandard and unacceptable due to his excessive produc-
tion of defective parts which had to be scrapped. Alexander, how-
ever, regarded this explanation a pretext for the fact that he was
wrongfully terminated from employment.
The collective-bargaining agreement in effect between Alex-
ander's union and his former employer provided that if an em-
ployee felt that the company had breached the agreement to his
detriment, the worker had the right to lodge a grievance within 5
days of the alleged breach. On October 1, 1969, Alexander filed a
grievance, stating merely that he had been "unjustly" discharged
and omitting any reference to racial discrimination.
The collective-bargaining agreement contained a clause pro-
hibiting the company from discriminating against any employee,
inter alia, on the basis of race. Further, if a dispute could not be
resolved informally between the employee and the company via
the grievance mechanism, the controversy was to be submitted to
final and binding arbitration before an arbitrator jointly selected
and paid by the union and the company.
Union officials processed Alexander's grievance through sev-
eral stages of negotiation. At the last step in the prearbitration
phase, Alexander interposed a claim of racial discrimination. The
company denied this claim. The parties at loggerheads, the mat-
ter was submitted to arbitration. After the claim was referred to
an arbitrator but before a decision was rendered, Alexander filed
a charge of racial discrimination with the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission due to an apparent lack of confidence on his part in
the arbitration process. The state commission promptly referred
the complaint to the EEOC. This occurred in November of 1969.
Subsequently, an arbitration hearing was held, and on December
30, 1969, the arbitrator ruled adversely to the grievant, conclud-
ing that Alexander has been "discharged for just cause" and mak-
ing no mention of the charge of discrimination.0
Meanwhile, on July 25, 1970, the EEOC completed its inves-
tigation of the charge and determined that the facts presented no
reasonable cause to believe that a Title VII violation had oc-
curred. Following receipt of his statutory notice of right to sue,
Alexander commenced a timely action in federal court.
" The district court found that the discrimination claim had, in fact, been raised in
the arbitration proceeding, despite the arbitrator's omission of any reference to it in his
decision. 346 F. Supp. at 1014, noted in the Supreme Court opinion at 415 U.S. 36, 43 &
43 n.4. But see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., Civil No. C-2476 (D. Colo., Nov. 19,
1974) (unpublished opinion), where on remand the district court said the opposite.
1975
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Thus, prior to his arrival in court, plaintiff Alexander had
submitted his claim of racial discrimination in employment to
two separate bodies, one private (arbitrator) and the other public
(EEOC). Both independently concluded that his claim was with-
out foundation in fact.
III. DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT COURTS
Alexander's action came before Judge Fred M. Winner of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado on a motion for
summary judgment filed by the defendant.2 The company
argued that plaintiff's voluntary submission of his discrimination
charge to binding arbitration, which resulted in a rejection of his
grievance, should preclude him from proceeding further in the
matter by court action and urged that the cause of action be
dismissed.
After disposing of preliminary matters," Judge Winner faced
this "vital and troublesome issue."23 Observing that prior to the
present action the plaintiff had unsuccessfully sought relief in two
different forums, the court phrased the question presented in
terms of "just how many chances plaintiff should be afforded to
try to establish his claim of discrimination."24
Prior to undertaking analysis and discussion of "two diamet-
ric lines of authority ' 25 pertinent to the main issue, Judge Winner
excerpted generously from Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co.26 In
that case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that when a
potential Title VII claimant submits his employment discrimina-
tion charge to grievance-arbitration procedures, the 180-day stat-
ute of limitations is tolled.27 If this were not so, the Fifth Circuit
reasoned, Congress' intent to place primary reliance on informal
and private means of resolving Title VII disputes would be frus-
trated. The court's reference to Culpepper therefore served to
2 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 346 F. Supp. 1012 (1971).
22 Defendant also urged entry of summary judgment in its favor on two other grounds:
(1) that complaint was not filed within the 30-day period following notification of right to
sue from the EEOC, and; (2) that an EEOC finding of reasonable cause to believe the
charge was a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit which was absent here. Judge Winner
rejected the first ground in view of an extension of the time for filing the complaint
previously granted by the court. Defendant's second contention was held to be without








focus attention on the fact that Title VII was designed to empha-
size the role of informal methods of securing compliance with the
Act.
Judge Winner then quoted extensively from Hutchings v.
United Industries, Inc., 8 a case which held, on public policy
grounds, that "the federal courts cannot be divested of jurisdic-
tion of a Title VII action by any arbitration procedure under a
labor contract." 9 In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals highlighted the dissimilarities between
grievance-arbitration founded upon contract and judicial pro-
ceedings based upon federal statute. These differences, the court
felt, compelled the inference that the filing of a grievance accord-
ing to the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement and the
filing of a judicial action do not constitute enforcement of an
indentical right in separate forums. Rather, the contractual and
statutory rights are of independent origin, and the enforcement
of one should have no influence upon the right to enforce the
other.30 Furthermore, the Hutchings court was of the opinion that
the structure and language of the Act clearly indicated that Con-
gress intended the federal judiciary, and not the EEOC or private
arbitrators, to be the final decisionmaker as to an individual's
rights under Title VII. The doctrine of election of remedies has
application only insofar as it might prevent a windfall to a plain-
tiff; it may be utilized only to avoid duplication of relief, not to
preclude court action altogether. Thus when a plaintiff has not
received adequate relief by means of arbitration, election of reme-
dies cannot be interposed to foreclose prosecution of the claim-
ant's federal statutory right of action.
The court then directed its attention to the antithetical view
as expressed in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.3 In this case the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that to allow an em-
ployee to bring suit under Title VII after he had unsuccessfully
submitted the same complaint to final arbitration "could sound
the death knell to arbitration of labor disputes" because a situa-
tion would be created in which "the employer, but not the em-
ployee, [would be] bound by the arbitration."" Having nothing
- 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970).
" 346 F. Supp. at 1015.
" 428 F.2d at 312-14.
31 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971)
(Harlan, J., not participating).
" Id. at 332 quoted in 346 F. Supp. at 1016.
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to gain but everything to lose in arbitration, employers, in the
Dewey court's opinion, would tend to ignore the process entirely.
Such result would run afoul of the well-established federal policy
which favors arbitration of labor disputes.
33
Noting that Dewey was affirmed by an equally divided Su-
preme Court, 4 Judge Winner embraced the case in its entirety,
and held that:
[W]hen an employee voluntarily submits a claim of discrimination
to arbitration under a union contract grievance procedure-a sub-
mission which is binding on the employer no matter what the re-
sult-the employee is bound by the arbitration award just as is the
employer. We cannot accept a philosophy which gives the employee
two strings to his bow when the employer has only one.n
The court reiterated Dewey's prediction that a contrary holding
would sound the "death knell" to arbitration. Arbitration which
would always obligate the employer but never the employee
would, in Judge Winner's colorful language, constitute "a trial
balloon for the employee, but a moon shot for the employer."3
This disparity would amount to preferential treatment of minor-
ity group members, a result, in the court's interpretation, prohib-
ited by Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
37
Alexander thus presented a question novel in this circuit.
Faced with an irreconciliable split of authority on the issue, the
court chose the viewpoint headlined by Dewey. Although the pos-
sible impact of the opposite view, the demise of arbitration alto-
gether, was perhaps overstated, the precedent chosen by Judge
Winner has certain appeal to notions of fair play and common
sense, especially when juxtaposed with the federal policy favoring
arbitration as a means of settling labor disputes. Also Dewey was
alluring in that the Supreme Court had failed to disapprove of it.
3 429 F.2d at 337.
- 402 U.S. 689 (1971). A Supreme Court affirmance by an equally divided opinion
is, of course, not authoritative as precedent, but binds only the parties before the court.
See 1B J. MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTIcE 0.402[2] at 119 n.26 (2d ed. 1974).
346 F. Supp. at 1019. Judge Winner goes on to say that "Congress has [already]
given the employee one and one-half strings under the Equal Employment Opportunity
procedure." Id. The "one-half string" referred to is the assistance from the EEOC to which
a claimant is entitled if the EEOC finds probable cause to believe that discrimination has
occurred. The metaphor chosen (to what conceivable use could one put half a bowstring?)
belies the importance of this resource to an aggrieved employee. To be sure, it represents
an advantage, and no doubt the court felt this extra edge sufficient to render further
unilateral aid to the employee unnecessary, if not downright unfair.
" 346 F. Supp. at 1019.
-7 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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In addition, the Dewey preclusion rule finds inferential support
in the fact that Congress clearly manifested an intention to rely
primarily on informal avenues of relief in the effectuation of the
goals of Title VII. No doubt these factors weighed heavily in the
decison of the Tenth Circuit to accord the case only summary
treatment on appeal.
Plaintiff Alexander appealed the district court's award of
summary judgment in favor of the defendant company. The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals (Hill and Barrett, Circuit Judges,
and Langley, District Judge, presiding) affirmed Judge Winner's
ruling in a per curiam opinion." Finding the trial court's memo-
randum opinion "exhaustive of the authorities and conclusive in
resolution of the issue," it merely affirmed the judgment "on the
basis of the trial court's opinion and order, as reported."39
In view of the brevity of the Tenth Circuit opinion, one must
look solely to the opinion entered by the district court in order to
ascertain the circuit's attitude toward the issue presented. The
court set forth a summary of the facts which preceded institution
of the plaintiffs federal suit. One can only guess that this was
intended to underscore the fact that plaintiff was afforded more
than one opportunity to gain relief before he entered the federal
courthouse. Apparently the court felt that two chances were
enough.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, holding that the statutory right to a trial de
novo afforded employees by Title VII cannot be divested by prior
submission of the same claim to binding arbitration pursuant to
an antidiscrimination clause contained in a collective-bargaining
agreement."0 In rejecting the rationale of the lower courts, the
Supreme Court manifested its determination to insure full play
to the Civil Rights Act in the employment arena.
Alexander comprehensively explores the function of Title VII
as reflected in the statutory language and legislative history and
examines its relationship to the arbitration process within the
realm of labor disputes in general. The opinion does not discount
the well-recognized importance of arbitration as a primary device
466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 1210.
415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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in maintaining industrial peace; rather, it stresses Congress' in-
tended mission for Title VII in extirpating unlawful discrimina-
tory practices from employment.
The Supreme Court recited some basic principles bearing on
a Title VII action:
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
assure equality of employment opportunities by eliminating those
practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. Cooperation and voluntary compli-
ance were selected as the preferred means for achieving this goal.4'
Before allowing an aggrieved party to file suit in federal court,
Congress required that he first attempt to resolve his dispute
informally and provided opportunities for nonjudicial solutions
through establishment of the EEOC and through provisions
which permit utilization of other similar state and local agen-
cies. " These agencies, the Court noted, however, lack direct en-
forcement powers; therefore, it follows that "final responsibility
for enforcement of Title VII is vested with federal courts.
43
Congress conferred upon the courts broad authority to fash-
ion whatever equitable relief is deemed appropriate under the
circumstances of a particular case." Such remedial power re-
mains available despite a "no cause" finding by the EEOC.45 The
confluence of the courts' broad equitable powers and the fact that
EEOC disposition of discrimination charges has no jurisdictional
relevance led the Court to conclude that the power of the federal
courts to secure compliance with Title VII is "plenary.
4
The EEOC's authority under Title VII to investigate and to
conciliate is typically set in motion by charges of individual em-
ployees. Although the 1972 Act permits the EEOC to bring suit
in its own right, private suits continue to be the predominate
mode of Title VII enforcement efforts. Private actions fulfill two
functions simultaneously: "the private litigant not only redresses
' Id. at 44 (citations omitted).
42 Id. See also Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
41 415 U.S. at 44. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 did grant the
EEOC authority to bring suit in its own name. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(fO(1) (Supp. H,
1972) and text accompanying note 12, supra. Despite this significant augmentation, Con-
gress declined to grant the EEOC direct enforcement power: it still cannot "adjudicate
claims or impose administrative sanctions." 415 U.S. at 44.
", 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. H, 1972). See authorities cited note 19 supra, and
accompanying text.
41 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973).
11 415 U.S. at 45.
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his own injury but also vindicates the important congressional
policy against discriminatory employment practices."47
The Act is silent with respect to what bearing an arbitrator's
finding has on an employee's right to sue under Title VII. Thus,
the Court pointed out, "[t]here is no suggestion in the statutory
scheme that a prior arbitral decision either forecloses an individ-
ual's right to sue or divests federal courts of jurisdiction."48 The
statute does, however, make clear that federal courts are to have
plenary powers of enforcement as to Title VII and spells out the
jurisdictional prerequisites to suit.4"
Following this abstract of general principles, the Court ex-
plained its reasons for reversing the decision of the Tenth Circuit.
Legislation in the employment sphere, the Court explained, has
"long evidenced a general intent to accord parallel or overlapping
remedies against discrimination."5 Title VII itself, said the
Court,
provides for consideration of employment-discrimination claims in
several forums .... (EEOC) . .. (state and local agencies) ...
(federal courts). And, in general, submission of a claim to one forum
does not preclude a later submission to another. Moreover, the legis-
lative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow
an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title
VII and other applicable state and federal statutes. The clear infer-
ence is that Title VII was designed to supplement, rather than sup-
plant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment dis-
crimination. In sum, Title VII's purpose and procedures strongly
suggest that an individual does not forfeit his private cause of action
if he first pursues his grievance to final arbitration under the nondis-
crimination clause of a collective-bargaining agreement.'
The preceding quotation captures the essence of the Court's deci-
sion to part company with the lower courts on this issue. The
Court fleshes in its rationale through analysis of the trilogy of
notions which led the district and circuit courts to believe that
the opposite view was warranted: election of remedies, waiver,
and the federal policy which favors arbitration of labor disputes.
A. Election of Remedies
The Court summarily repudiated possible application of the
47 Id.
Id. at 47.
" Id. These requirements are: (1) that a timely charge of discrimination be filed with
the EEOC; and (2) that the charging party receive notice of his right to sue from the
EEOC and thereafter lodge his complaint seasonably.
,o Id.
11 Id. at 47-49 (citations and footnote omitted).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
doctrine of election of remedies, declaring it pertinent only when
an individual seeks remedies inconsistent in either a legal or fac-
tual sense.52 This concept could, therefore, have no relevance to
a situation in which an employee seeks to vindicate two separate
rights. In consenting to engage in grievance-arbitration proce-
dures, an employee pursues redress of a contractual right-as
signatory to a collective-bargaining agreement. In instituting liti-
gation under Title VII, on the other hand, an employee seeks
vindication of a statutory right-as a person within the class to
be protected by an act of Congress. Since the rights emanate from
different sources, they are separate and distinct. Pursuit of both
thus cannot constitute pursuit of inconsistent remedies.
The Court analogized this procedure to that for settling dis-
putes under the National Labor Relations Act. If a dispute entails
violations of both contractual and statutory rights, the National
Labor Relations Board is free to consider statutory claims, de-
spite the fact that an arbitrator may have previously considered
them in the guise of contractual rights. As the arbitrator and the
NLRB are complementary under this scheme, so are the arbitra-
tor and the federal court in the Title VII context.13
Unjust enrichment as a possible reason to require application
of the doctrine of election of remedies was also rejected. The
Court observed that provision to employees of a double opportun-
ity to seek relief against alleged discrimination will not lead to a
windfall on the part of a claimant. Unjust enrichment presents
no danger because courts, consonant with their equitable author-
ity, will doubtlessly structure relief to avoid duplication in a case
where a plaintiff has previously achieved some satisfaction in
arbitration. 4
B. Waiver
The concept of waiver was likewise discarded as having no
bearing on cases of this nature. The Court flatly pronounced that
"there can be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights under
Title VII." 5" Characterizing the mandate of Title VII as absolute,
the Court concluded that to allow rights conferred by the Act to
be waived in the process of bargaining collectively "would defeat
"Id. at 49 n.ll.
"Id. at 50.




the paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII."
Certain instances in which waiver can play a legitimate part
in the collective-bargaining process, however, were recognized by
the Court. Some statutory rights, e.g., the right to strike, are
waivable on a collective basis as a means of winning, in return,
economic benefits for the members of a bargaining unit. 7 Such
waivable rights are collective in character. Title VII guarantees,
by contrast, are individualistic in nature and concern "not major-
itarian processes, but an individual's right to equal employment
opportunities."58 As such, they are non-negotiable in the bargain-
ing process.
Even rights conferred by Title VII may presumably be
waived by an individual if the waiver occurs in connection with
a voluntary settlement. As with other civil rights, such waivers,
to be effective, must be both "voluntary and knowing."59 In no
event, however, can the individual's right to be free from discrim-
ination in employment be deemed waived merely by virtue of the
fact that the employee submitted his claim to binding arbitration
under an anti-discrimination clause of a collective-bargaining
agreement.
The limited role of the arbitrator in labor disputes suggested
to the Court further reason to reject the preclusion rule. The
arbitrator's responsibility is circumscribed. His duty is to fulfill
the intent of the parties through interpretation and application
of the collective-bargaining agreement from whence his authority
derives. Unlike a court he has "no general authority to invoke
public laws that conflict with the bargain between parties
... .,,6 Contractual rights are his only concern. If a bargaining
agreement duplicates rights created by Title VII, the arbitrator
must, of course, effectuate them in a proper case. In so doing,
however, he does not, nor cannot, usurp the jurisdiction of federal
courts to deal with them because the rights devolve from separate
origins. In a situation in which the agreement contains no protec-
tion against practices prohibited by Title VII, the arbitrator ex-
"Id.
AId. See, e.g., Satterwhite v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 496 F.2d 448 (10th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 668 (1974), discussed in the section on Labor Law, supra at
272. See also United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 63 F.R.D. 1 (N.D. Ala.
1974).
11 415 U.S. at 52 n.15.
0 Id. at 53.
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ceeds the scope of his authority if he attempts to enforce rights
of this kind, and the award becomes judicially unenforceable.6' In
short, if the agreement does not provide Title VII guarantees, the
arbitrator is powerless to recognize them. If the agreement con-
tains Title VII protections, the arbitrator is bound to enforce
them, but by doing so, he enforces contractual, not statutory,
rights. Despite the overlap, a federal court is not deprived of its
jurisdiction over the same claims.
C. Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration
The third ground apparently relied on by the district court
and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was that allowance to the
employee of two opportunities to redress Title VII claims was
contrary to the strong federal policy favoring arbitration of labor
disputes. If, for instance, the plaintiff in Alexander had secured
from arbitration an award beneficial to him, the defendant com-
pany would have been bound by the decision. The district court
felt that notions of fairness dictated that the same conclusiveness
should attach with respect to the employee's rights. The Court's
short answer to the district court's objection that the employee
has "'two strings to his bow when the employer has only one' "62
was that:
An employer does not have "two strings to his bow" with respect to
an arbitral decicion for the simple reason that Title VII does not
provide employers with a cause of action against employees. An
employer cannot be the victim of discriminatory employment prac-
tices .
3
Since employees, and not employers, are the only possible objects
of discriminatory employment practices, Congress understanda-
bly chose to afford them an extra measure of protection indepen-
dent from any rights won through bargaining collectively. The
employer has but a single set of rights-those contained in the
agreement. The employee, by contrast and at the behest of Con-
gress, has a dual set of rights-those contained in the agreement
and those contained in Title VII. When an employee files suit in
federal court he seeks not a review of the arbitrator's decision, but
to redress an independent statutory right.
The Court did not share the district court's apprehension
, Id., citing United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
AZ 415 U.S. at 54, quoting 346 F. Supp. at 1019.
' 415 U.S. at 54.
VOL. 52
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY
that a rule which would render arbitration inconclusive as to the
employee, but not as to the employer, would "'sound the death
knell for arbitration clauses in labor contracts.' ""' The Court
observed that the primary incentive remains for an employer to
enter into a collective-bargaining agreement containing an arbi-
tration provision in order to obtain from the union a no-strike
concession. This goal will ordinarily outweight intrepidations
which an employer might entertain with regard to possible in-
creased costs associated with providing employees an "arbitral
remedy against discrimination in addition to their judicial rem-
edy under Title VII." 5
Also, arbitral remedies against discrimination can perform
an important prophylactic function. If arbitration is fairly and
objectively executed, many employee discrimination complaints
will be resolved at this level, obviating the need for litigation.
Working out differences though arbitration can be done more
quickly and less expensively than through formal court action.
For these reasons, the Court declined to join in the district court's
pessimistic prophecy as to the likely ramifications of the "two
strings" non-preclusion rule.
D. Deferral Rule
As an alternative to their argument for a preclusion rule, the
respondent urged adoption of a stance intermediate between a
preclusion rule and an absolute rejection of it. The company sug-
gested that:
[Elven if a preclusion rule is not adopted, federal courts should
defer to arbitral decision on discrimination claims where: (i) the
claim was before the arbitrator; (ii) the collective-bargaining agree-
ment prohibited the form of discrimination charged in the suit
under Title VII; and (iii) the arbitrator has authority to rule on the
claim and to fashion a remedy."
Id., quoting 346 F. Supp. at 1019.
" 415 U.S. at 55. One commentator has suggested a further reason why Alexander
will not sound the "death knell" to arbitration:
[Tihe scope of the arbitration clause is subject to collective bargaining. The
employer can bargain for a clause expressly stating that racial discrminiation
claims are outside the scope of the arbitration clause and must be pursued
in some other appropriate forum.
Comment, supra note 1, at 667.
66 415 U.S. at 55-56 (footnote omitted). See Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 467 F.2d
54, 58 (5th Cir. 1972), where the court said that a federal court may, in limited circumstan-




According to this scheme, if the above conditions were satisfied
in a particular suit, the court could properly grant summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendant-employer and dismiss the action.
In the Court's view, however, this rule would "deprive the peti-
tioner of his statutory right to attempt to establish his claim in a
federal court." 7 The deferral rule would be vulnerable to many
of the objections associated with the preclusion rule, and the
Court concluded that its adoption would detract from Congress'
intent to repose final authority for carrying out the dictates of
Title VII in the federal judiciary.
Recognizing that selection of forum necessarily determines
the scope of the right sought to be enforced, the Court made a
detailed analysis of the arbitral forum as compared to federal
court, pointing up the several ways in which arbitration as an
ajudicatory process falls short of the court's ability to protect
substantive rights. The limited nature of the arbitrator's role was
again stressed. He is bound by the intent of the parties as ex-
pressed in the collective-bargaining agreement; his competence
lies in the realm of "the law of the shop, not the law of the land."68
Many arbitrators are lay persons, not lawyers.69 In sum, the skill
and role of the arbitrator tend to render the arbitral forum inap-
propriate for the resolution of independent statutory rights ac-
corded by Title VII "whose broad language frequently can be
given meaning only by reference to public law concepts."70
As compared to the judicial forum the arbitration process is
subject to several structural weaknesses. Fact-finding in arbitra-
tion hearings is informal and less comprehensive, and the rules
of evidence and civil procedure have no application. Further-
more, the union's total control of the manner in which grievances
are instituted and processed and the concomitant risk that an
individual member's interests may be given short shrift for the
good of the collective also suggest the inappropriateness of arbi-
tration as a forum for ultimate determination of statutory rights.'
These factors all militate against approval of a deferral rule.
Nor was the Court receptive to the idea of a more demanding
deferral rule. "Judicialization" of the arbitration process would
deprive this forum of its cardinal advantages of comparative inex-
415 U.S. at 56.
U Id. at 57.
s Id. at 57 n.18.
70 Id. at 57.
Id. at 58 n.19.
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pensiveness and speediness in resolution of grievances. Court en-
forcement of a higher standard created by imposition of quasi-
judicial procedures upon the arbitration process would necessi-
tate a complicated review of almost de novo magnitude. Savings
of court time would therefore be insufficient to justify inherent
hazards to Title VII rights.
Finally, the Court noted the danger of a recoil effect asso-
ciated with the deferral rule. Employees who lacked complete
confidence in the arbitration procedure would tend to bypass it
altogether rather than risk an adverse finding which would be
conclusive of their rights in the judicial forum. As a consequence,
the proportion of grievances submitted to arbitration (and thus
susceptible to informal resolution) might diminish and cause a
correlative increase in litigation which would more than offset
possible savings of court time from utilization of the deferral rule.
E. Conclusion
After rejecting the preclusion and deferral rules as incompat-
ible with the nature and purpose of Title VII, the Court con-
cluded:
[T]hat the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and
the federal policy against discriminatory employment practices can
best be accommodated by permitting an employee to pursue fully
both his remedy under the grievance-arbitration clause of a
collective-bargaining agreement and his cause of action under Title
VII. The federal court should consider the employee's claim de
novo. 12
This conclusion clearly establishes that Title VII actions brought
by private employees are to be heard de novo in federal court and
that whether the plaintiff has previously submitted his discrimi-
nation claim to arbitration shall have no bearing on his right to
file suit.
The Court finally stated that the "arbitral decision may be
admitted as evidence and accorded such weight as the court
deems appropriate."73 As a practical matter, this may weaken to
some extent the general proposition that arbitration shall not
influence the scope of litigation. However, the Court explicitly
refused to announce standards by which to determine the weight
of the arbitration record in a particular case and admonished
courts to be ever mindful that Congress has seen fit to provide
12 Id. at 59-60.
11 Id. at 60.
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discrimination claimants with "a judicial forum for the ultimate
resolution of discriminatory employment claims."74
In Alexander the Supreme Court declined to diminish the
potency of Title VII as a remedial device for employment discrim-
ination.
POSTSCRIPT
On remand plaintiff Alexander's action was tried de novo
before Judge Richard P. Matsch of the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado.75 The court found that Alexan-
der's last position with the company, as a drill press operator
trainee, was one which required very careful and precise work.
During his tenure at this job Alexander received three written
warnings from his supervisor to the effect that his performance
was substandard. Customarily drill press trainees were dis-
charged from the company after two such warnings or else al-
lowed to transfer to another position which required less precision
in performance. Alexander's supervisor informed him of the pos-
sibility of transfer to a new job with the company. Alexander
chose not to seek a change of position; and after having issued
three warnings to him, the company terminated his employment.
Due to the fact that Alexander had only one supervisor during
this period (who was responsible for the issuance of all three
warnings), the court felt that the merits of plaintiff's claim de-
pended entirely on the question of whether that supervisor was
racially prejudiced in his supervision of the plaintiff's perform-
ance. The court concluded that he was not and therefore found
that plaintiff was "discharged from his employment with the de-
fendant company for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason."7
Accordingly, the court ordered dismissal of plaintiff's complaint
and entry of judgment in favor of the defendant.
II. WELFARE-SOCIAL SECURITY ACT-AID TO
FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN- STANDARD
WORK EXPENSES DEDUCTION
Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251 (1974)
INTRODUCTION
Mrs. Ascension Vialpando was found eligible for and was
Id. at 60 n.21.
7' Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., Civil No. C-2476 (D. Colo., Nov. 19, 1974) (un-
published opinion).
7 Id. at 5.
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receiving benefits under Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren (AFDC) prior to July 1, 1970. On that date a new Colorado
regulation was promulgated by the Colorado Division of Public
Welfare' which established a limit of $30 as the standard allow-
ance for work-related expenses. This regulation affected Mrs.
Vialpando adversely by significantly reducing her deduction from
net earnings for work-related expenses' thereby making her ineli-
gible for any of her previous AFDC benefits. 3 Mrs. Vialpando
brought a class action suit, Vialpando v. Shea,4 in the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado seeking declara-
tory and injunctive relief. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff
and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.' This
comment will examine the background of this case, and explore
why the Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.'
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Originally passed by the Congress in 1935, the Social Secu-
rity Act 7 provides for federal money matched by state money to
be distributed to individuals determined to be in need of assis-
tance and fitting into one of the categories of need.' One of the
COLORADO DIVISION OF PUBLIC WELFARE, 4 STAFF MANUAL § 4313.13 (1970).
The effect of the new Colorado regulation on Mrs. Vialpando is shown by this table
taken from Reply Brief for Appellant at 5, Vialpando v. Shea, 475 F.2d 731 (10th Cir.
1973):
During and after
Before July of 1970 July of 1970
Mandatory Deductions $ 55.72 $ 55.72
General Work Expenses 15.00 15.00
Transportation:
Mileage 47.30 30.00
Car Payment 63.81 15.00
$181.83 $ 85.72
Plus Child Care Plus Child Care
Prior to July 1, 1970, Mrs. Vialpando was allowed to deduct $181.83 from her net earnings
as her actual work-related expenses; after July 1, 1970, she was limited to deducting only
$85.72. The loss of $96.11 of deductions caused her net earnings to be too high to qualify
for AFDC benefits.
' The benefits include cash benefits and eligibility for medical assistance under medi-
caid. See Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (1970).
' Civil No. C-2449 (D. Colo., January 13, 1972).
' Shea v. Vialpando, 475 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1973).
' Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251 (1974).
' The provisions of the Social Security Act relating to AFDC are found at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 601-44 (1970).
' Old Age Assistance, id. § 301; Aid to Families with Dependant Children, id. § 601;
Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled, id. § 801; Aid to the Blind, id. § 1201; Aid to the
Permanently and Totally Disabled, id. § 1351.
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categories established under the Social Security Act is AFDC.
States are not required to participate, but if a state elects to do
so, its plan for administering the program must be approved by
the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare (HEW), and must meet certain requirements.9 If by later
alteration the state's plan fails to comply with Social Security Act
provisions, the Secretary of HEW, after notice and an opportun-
ity for a hearing, may refuse to furnish all or part of the federal
funds to the state.'0
State plans must comply with the provisions of section
402(a) (7) of the Social Security Act." That section requires that:
(a) A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children
must ... (7) ... provide that the State Agency shall, in determin-
ing need, take into consideration any other income and resources of
any child or relative claiming aid to families with dependent chil-
dren . . . as well as any expenses reasonably attributable to the
earning of any such income. . ...,
This section operates in two ways: to determine eligibility and to
determine the amount of a grant of assistance.'3
The Colorado regulation implemented in July, 1970, and at
issue in the Vialpando case, read in part as follows:
For employment expenses such as transportation, special clothing,
union dues, special education or training costs, telephone, addi-
tional food or personal needs, etc., which are an obligation due to
the employment, an allowance of $30 per month is made for such
costs."
This regulation, which sets a standard allowance of $30 for work-
related expenses, was approved by the Secretary of HEW in July
' Among other things, the provisions of the Social Security Act provide that the state
program must permit application by all who wish to apply; that the state program must
be in effect in all political subdivisions of the state. Id. § 602(a)(1). The program must
insure efficient operation. Id. § 602(a)(5)(A). Assistance must be provided as far as prac-
ticable. Id. § 601. Aid must be provided with reasonable promptness to all eligible. Id. §
602(a)(10). The state of Colorado asserted that a standard work expense allowance was
the only feasible way to comply with all of these provisions.
I d. § 604.
Id. § 602(a)(7).
12 Id.
' CoLoRADo DMISION OF PuLIC WELFARE, 4 STAFF MANUAL § 4313.13 (1970). Gross
earned income is reduced by payroll reductions and work expenses to yield net income.
Net income is compared to state standards of need to determine eligibility for AFDC
benefits. The work expense disregard of § 402(a)(7) and the "earned income disregard"
of § 402(a)(8)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(ii) are then applied in another formula to




1970. The impact of using a standard allowance for work-related
expenses other than mandatory payroll deductions, instead of
computing the actual work-related expenses, was to reduce the
amount of the grants to some applicants, or, as in Mrs. Vial-
pando's case, to make some applicants ineligible for assistance.
The issue which the district court confronted in the
Vialpando case was whether the Colorado regulation complied
with the requirements of the Social Security Act. The court did
not believe that it did and ordered Colorado to change the regula-
tion to include consideration of all individualized expenses in
determining eligibility for assistance. The defendant, the State of
Colorado, maintained throughout the appeals, however, that a
reasonable average ($30) sufficed to meet the requirements of the
Social Security Act.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S CONCERNS IN Vialpando
The Supreme Court, as did the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, closely examined the statutory provision in rejecting the
state's argument that the requirement to "take into considera-
tion" was satisfied by using a statistical average of actual expen-
ses of all AFDC recipients in the state. The Court read the provi-
sion to be structured so "that the phrase 'take into consideration'
modifies 'income and resources . . . as well as any expenses rea-
sonably attributable to the earning of any such income.' "'5 Thus
the "inescapable" conclusion" of both courts was that treatment
of expenses must be the same as treatment of income, that is, on
an individual basis.
The Supreme Court also examined the legislative history of
section 402(a)(7) and found that it confirmed the Court's inter-
pretation of the provision. Prior to 1962 state agencies were en-
couraged but not required to recognize special financial circum-
stances of employed assistance recipients. 7 By 1962 it was recog-
nized that if work expenses were not to be considered, they would
provide a disincentive to working, since work expenses reduce the
amount of money available for food, shelter, and clothing." Thus,
the clause "as well as any expenses reasonably attributable to the
earning of any such income" was added to the section. 9 The
" Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 260 (1974) (emphasis by the Court).
Ie /d.
" See Social Security Board, Bureau of Public Assistance, State Letter No. 4 (April
30, 1942). See also HEW State Letter No. 291 (March 11, 1957).
" See S. RsP. No. 1589, 87 Cong., 2d Sess. 1718 (1962).
" Act of July 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 106(b), 76 Stat. 185, 188.
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intent of Congress was to insure that all states take employment
expenses fully into account in determining need.
20
Finally the Supreme Court examined the administrative in-
terpretations associated with the Social Security Act. The De-
partment of HEW, while it did not view the use of maximum
allowance as acceptable,2' did view the standard based on averag-
ing acceptable and noted its use as advantageous administra-
tively.2 2 The Supreme Court, however, rejected administrative
efficiency or convenience as controlling in light of the statutory
command and the congressional purpose. 3
III. EFFECT OF Vialpando
While the conclusion of the Court might have been pre-
dicted, its importance lies in its effect. An attempt to extend the
use of statistically based standard amounts, as allowed in Rosado
v. Wyman,24 was checked by Vialpando. In Rosado the Supreme
Court approved the use of statistically based flat amounts for a
determination of a state standard of need, but in Vialpando the
Court clearly indicates that the grant of discretion given by Con-
gress to the states to determine eligibility for aid does not extend
to calculation of the amount of work-related expenses. Such a
grant of discretion must be expressly given.
The decision sustains the holdings of most lower courts that
had considered the issue,25 and it clarifies whatever confusion the
other courts had experienced when facing similar situations.
Conover v. Hall21 had upheld California's $50 standard allowance.
" See S. REP. No. 1589, 87 Cong., 2d Sess. 1718 (1962).
2 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Adams v. Parham, Civil No.
16041 (N.D. Ga., April 14, 1972).
2 Id. The standard work expense allowance was claimed to have administrative ad-
vantages of
(a) reducing error;
(b) giving the recipient greater certainty as to the amount of the grant;
(c) reducing delay in computation and payment;
(d) reducing the use of subjective judgment by the individual in the posi-
tion of determining eligibility; and
(e) making a uniform statewide program possible.
416 U.S. at 265 n.13.
24 397 U.S. 397, 419 (1970).
n Anderson v. Graham, 492 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1973); Connecticut State Dept. of Pub.
Welfare v. HEW, 448 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1971); Campagnuolo v. White, Civil No. 13968 (D.
Conn., June 22, 1972); Adams v. Parham, Civil No. 16041 (N.D. Ga., April 14, 1972);
Williford v. Laupheimer, 311 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Pa. 1969); County of Alameda v. Carle-
son, 5 Cal. 3d 730, 488 P.2d 953, 97 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1971), appeal dismissed, 406 U.S. 913
(1972).
n 28 Cal. App. 3d 676, 104 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1972).
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The decision was later vacated pending appeal in the California
Supreme Court. In X v. McCorkle" the Court had approved in
dicta (as the Supreme Court emphasizes) the $50 standard work
expense allowance of New Jersey.
CONCLUSION
Shea v. Vialpando represents the present Supreme Court's
need to solidly ground its welfare case decisions on clear statutory
construction and congressional intent. State discretion in imple-
mentation will not be presumed in an area clearly provided for
by the Congress.
Clear congressional intent was not found in New York State
Department of Social Services v. Dublino.28 In that case, welfare
plaintiffs attempted to show that the federally sponsored WIN
program preempted the New York Work Rules, but the court
found no evidence of such a congressional intent to preempt. The
court stated that "more would be required [than the apparent
comprehensiveness of the WIN legislation] to show the 'clear
manifestation of [congressional] intention' which must exist be-
fore a federal statute is held 'to supersede the exercise' of state
action." 9
Clearly, in Vialpando at least, we have an expression of in-
tent with which the court can feel comfortable.
Christine A. Gilsinan
r 333 F. Supp. 1109 (D.N.J. 1970).
" 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
" Id. at 408.
1975

